The Last Joint Debate!
at
SENATOR DOUGLAS’ SPEECH.
Long and loud bursts of applause greeted Senator Douglas when he appeared on the stand. As he was about to commence speaking, he was interrupted by Dr. Hope, one of the Danite1 faction.
Dr. Hope.—Judge, before you commence speaking, allow me to ask you a question.
Senator Douglas.—If you will not occupy too much of my time.
Dr. Hope.—Only an instant.
Senator Douglas.—What is your question?
Dr. Hope.—Do you believe that the Territorial legislatures ought to pass laws to protect slavery in the territories?
Senator Douglas.—You will get an answer in the course of my remarks. (Applause.)
Ladies and Gentlemen: It is not nearly four months since the canvass between Mr. Lincoln and myself commenced. On the 16th of June the Republican Convention assembled at Springfield and nominated Mr. Lincoln as their candidate for the U.S. Senate, and he, on that occasion, delivered a speech in which he laid down what he understood to be the Republican creed and the platform on which he proposed to stand during the contest. The principal points in that speech of Mr. Lincoln’s were: first, that this government could not endure permanently divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it; that they must all become free or all become slave; all become one thing or all become the other, otherwise the Union could not continue to exist. I give you his opinions almost in the identical language he used. His second proposition was a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States because of the Dred Scott decision; urging as an especial reason for his opposition to that decision that it deprived the negroes of the rights and benefits of that clause in the Constitution of the United States which guarantees to the citizens of each States, all the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens of the several States. On the 1oth of July I returned home, and delivered a speech to the people of Chicago, in which I announced it to be my purpose to appeal to the people of Illinois to sustain the course I had pursued in Congress. In that speech I joined issue with Mr. Lincoln on the points which he had presented. Thus there was an issue clear and distinct made up between us on these two propositions laid down in the speech of Mr. Lincoln at Springfield, and controverted by me in my reply to him at Chicago. On the next day, the 11th of July, Mr. Lincoln replied to me at Chicago, explaining at some length, and re-affirming the positions which he had taken in his Springfield speech. In that Chicago speech he even went further than he had before, and uttered sentiments in regard to the negro being on an equality with the white man. (That’s so.) He adopted in support of this position the argument which Lovejoy and Codding, and other Abolition lecturers had made familiar in the northern and central portions of the State, to wit: that the Declaration of Independence having declared all men free and equal, by Divine law, also that negro equality was an inalienable right, of which they could not be deprived. He insisted, in that speech, that the Declaration of Independence included the negro in the clause asserting that all men were created equal, and went so far as to say that if one man was allowed to take the position, that it did not include the negro, others might take the position that it did not include other men. He said that all these distinctions between this man and that man, this race and the other race, must be discarded, and we must all stand by the Declaration of Independence, declaring that all men were created equal.
The issue thus being made up between Mr. Lincoln and myself on three points, we went before the people of the State. During the following seven weeks, between the Chicago speeches and our first meeting at Ottawa, he and I addressed large assemblages of the people in many of the central counties. In my speeches I confined myself closely to those three positions which he had taken controverting his proposition that this Union could not exist as our fathers made it, divided into free and slave States, controverting his proposition of a crusade against the Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision, and controverting his proposition that the Declaration of Independence included and meant the negroes as well as the white men, when it declared all men to be created equal. (Cheers for Douglas). I supposed at that time that these propositions constituted a distinct issue between us, and that the opposite positions we had taken upon them we would be willing to be held to in every part of the State. I never intended to waver one hair’s breadth from that issue either in the north or the south, or wherever I should address the people of Illinois. I hold that when the time arrives that I cannot proclaim my political creed in the same terms not only in the northern but the southern part of Illinois, not only in the northern but the southern States, and wherever the American flag waves over American soil, that then there must be something wrong in that creed. (“Good, good,” and cheers.) So long as we live under a common constitution, so long as we live in a confederacy of sovereign and equal States, joined together as one for certain purposes, that any political creed is radically wrong which cannot be proclaimed in every State, and every section of that Union alike. I took up Mr. Lincoln’s three propositions in my several speeches, analyzed them, and pointed out what I believed to be the radical errors contained in them. First, in regard to his doctrine that this government was in violation of the law of God which say, that a house divided against itself cannot stand, I repudiated it as a slander upon the immortal framers of our constitution. I then said, have often repeated, and now again assert, that in my opinion this government can endure forever, (good,) divided into free and slave States as our fathers made it,—each State having the right to prohibit, abolish, or sustain slavery just as it pleases. (“Good,” “right,” and cheers.) This government was made upon the great basis of the sovereignty of the States, the right of each State to regulate its own domestic institutions to suit itself, and that right was conferred with understanding and expectation that inasmuch as each locality had separate interests, each locality must have different and distinct local and domestic institutions, corresponding to its wants and interests. Our fathers knew when they made the government, that the laws and institutions which were well adapted to the green mountains of Vermont, were unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina. They knew then, as well as we know now, that the laws and institutions which would be well adapted to the beautiful prairies of Illinois would not be suited to the mining regions of California. They knew that in a Republic as broad as this, having such a variety of soil, climate and interest, there must necessarily be a corresponding variety of local laws—the policy and institutions of each State adapted to its condition and wants. For this reason this Union was established on the right of each State to do as it pleased on the question of slavery, and every other question; and the various States were not allowed to complain of, much less interfere, with the policy of their neighbors. (“That’s good doctrine,” “that’s the doctrine,” and cheers.)
Suppose the doctrine advocated by Mr. Lincoln and the abolitionists of this day had prevailed when the Constitution was made, what would have been the result? Imagine for a moment that Mr. Lincoln had been a member of the convention that framed the Constitution of the United States, and that when its members were about to sign that wonderful document, he had arisen in that convention as he did at Springfield this summer, and addressing himself to the President, had said “a house divided against itself cannot stand; (laughter,) this government divided into free and slave States cannot endure, they must all be free or all be slave, they must all be one thing or all be the other, otherwise, it is a violation of the law of God, and cannot continue to exist;”—supposed Mr. Lincoln had convinced that body of sages, that that doctrine was sound, what would have been the result? Remember that the Union was then composed of thirteen States, twelve of which were slaveholding and one free. Do you think that the one free State would have outvoted the twelve slaveholding States, and thus have secured the abolition of slavery?—(No, no.) On the other hand, would not the twelve slaveholding States have outvoted the one free State, and thus have fastened slavery, by a Constitutional provision, on every foot of the American Republic forever? You see that if this abolition doctrine of Mr. Lincoln had prevailed when the government was made it would have established slavery as a permanent institution, in all the States whether they wanted it or not, and the question for us to determine is Illinois now as one of the free States is, whether or not we are willing, having become the majority section, to enforce a doctrine on the minority, which we would have resisted with our heart’s blood had it been attempted on us when we were in a minority. (“We never will,” good, good, and cheers.) How has the South lost her power as the majority section in this Union, and how have the free States gained it, except under the operation of that principle which declares the right of people of each State and each territory to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way. It was under that principle that slavery was abolished in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; it was under that principle that one half of the slaveholding States became free; it was under that principle that the number of free States increased until from being one out of twelve States, we have grown to be the majority of States of the whole Union, with the power to control the House of Representatives and Senate, and the power, consequently, to elect as President by Northern votes without the aid of a Southern State. Having obtained this power under the operation of that great principle, are you now prepared to abandon the principle and declare that merely because we have the power you will wage a war against the Southern States and their institutions until you force them to abolish slavery everywhere. (No, never, and great applause.)
After having pressed these arguments home on Mr. Lincoln for seven weeks, publishing a number of my speeches, we met at Ottawa in joint discussion, and he then began to crawfish a little, and let himself down. (Immense applause.) I there propounded certain questions to him. Amongst others, I asked him whether he would vote for the admission of any more slave States in the event the people wanted them. He would not answer. (Applause and laughter.) I then told him that if he did not answer the question there I would renew it at Freeport, and would then trot him down into Egypt and again put it to him. (Cheers.) Well, at Freeport, knowing that the next joint discussion took place in Egypt, and being in dread of it, he did answer my question in regard to no more slave States in a mode which he hoped would be satisfactory to me, and accomplish the object he had in view. I will show you what he answer was. After saying that he was not pledged to the Republican doctrine of “no more slave States,” he declared[:?]
“I state to you freely, frankly, that I should be exceedingly sorry to ever be put in a position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there never would be another slave State admitted into this Union.”
Here, permit to remark, that I do not think the people will ever force him into a position against his will. (Great laughter and applause.) He went on to say:
“But I must add in regard to this, that if slavery shall be kept out of the territory during the territorial existence of any one given territory and then the people should, having a fair chance and clear field when they come to adopt a constitution, if they should do the extraordinary thing of adopting a slave constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but we must admit it into the Union.”
That answer Mr. Lincoln supposed would satisfy the old-line Whigs, composed of Kentuckians and Virginians, down in the southern part of the State. Now, what does it amount to? I desire to know whether he would vote to allow Kansas to come into the Union with slavery or not, as her people desired. He would not answer; but in a round about way said that if slavery should be kept out of a territory during the whole of its territorial existence, and then the people, when they adopted a State constitution, asked admission as a slave State, he supposed he would have to let the State come in. The case I put to him was an entirely different one. I desired to know whether he would vote to admit a State if Congress had not prohibited slavery in it during its territorial existence, as Congress never pretended to do under Clay’s compromise measures of 1850. He would not answer, and I have not yet been able to get an answer fr m him. (Laughter, “he’ll answer this time,” “he’s afraid to answer,” etc.[etcetera]) I have asked him whether he would vote to admit Nebraska if her people asked to come in as a State with a constitution recognizing slavery, and he refused to answer. (“Put him through,” “give it to him,” and cheers.) I have put the question to him with reference to New Mexico, and he has not uttered a word in answer. I have enumerated the territories, one after another, putting the same question to him with reference to each, and he has not said, and will not say, whether, if elected to Congress, he will vote to admit any territory now in existence with such a constitution as her people may adopt. He invents a case which does not exist, and cannot exist under this government, and answers it; but he will not answer the question I put to him in connection with any of the territories now in existence. (“Hurrah for Douglas,” “three cheers for Douglas.”) The contract we entered into with Texas when she entered the Union obliges us to allow four States to be formed out of the old State, and admitted with or without slavery as the respective inhabitants of each may determine. I have asked Mr. Lincoln three times in our joint discussions whether he would vote to redeem that pledge, and he has never yet answered. He is as silent as the grave on the subject. (Laughter, “Lincoln must answer,” “he will,” &c.[etcetera]) He would rather answer as to a state of the case which will never arise than commit himself by telling what he would do in a case which would come up for his action soon after his election to Congress. (“He’ll never have to act on any question,” and laughter.) Why can he not say whether he is willing to allow the people of each State to have slavery or not as they please, and to come into the Union when they have the requisite population as a slave or a free State as they decide? I have no trouble in answering the question. I have said everywhere, and now repeat it to you, that if the people of Kansas want a slave State they have a right, under the constitution of the United States, to form such a State, and I will let them come into the Union with slavery or without, as they determine. (“That’s right,” “good,” “hurrah for Douglas all the time,” and cheers.) If the people of any other territory desire slavery let them have it. If they do not want it let them prohibit it. It is their business not mine. (“That’s it exactly,” “that’s so,” hurrah, &c.) It is none of our business in Illinois whether Kansas is a free State or a slave State. (“That’s the doctrine.”) It is none of your business in Missouri whether Kansas shall adopt slavery or reject it. It is the business of her people and none of yours. The people of Kansas has as much right to decide that question for themselves as you have in Missouri to decide it for yourselves, or we in Illinois to decide it for ourselves. (“That’s what we believe,” “We stand by that,” and cheers.)
And here I may repeat what I have said in every speech I have made in Illinois, that I fought the Lecompton constitution to its death, not because of the slavery clause in it, but because it was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas. I said then in Congress, and I say now, that if the people of Kansas want a slave State, they have a right to have it. If they wanted the Lecompton constitution, they had a right to have it. I was opposed to that constitution because I did not believe that it was the act and deed of the people, but on the contrary, the act of a small, pitiful minority acting in the name of the majority. When at last it was determined to send that constitution back to the people, and accordingly, in August last, the question of admission under it was submitted to a popular vote, the citizens rejected it by nearly ten to one, thus showing conclusively, that I was right when I said that the Lecompton constitution was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and did not embody their will. (Cheers.)
I hold that there is no power on earth, under our system of government, which has the right to force a constitution upon an unwilling people. (That’s so.) Suppose there had been a majority of ten to one in favor of slavery in Kansas, and suppose there had been an abolition President, and an abolition administration, and by some means the abolitionists succeeded in forcing an abolition constitution on those slaveholding people, would the people of the South have submitted to that act for one instant. (No, no.) Well, if you of the South would not have submitted to it a day, how can you, as fair, honorable and honest men insist on putting a slave constitution on a people who desire a free State. (“That’s so,” and cheers.) Your safety and ours depend upon both of us acting in good faith, and living up to that great principle which asserts the right of every people to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. (“That’s the doctrine,” and immense applause.)
Most of the men who denounced my course on the Lecompton question, objected to it not because I was not right, but because they thought it expedient at that time, for the sake of keeping the party together, to do wrong. (Cheers.) I never knew the Democratic party to violate any one of its principles out of policy or expediency, that it did not pay the debt with sorrow. There is no safety or success for our party unless we always do right, and trust the consequences to God and the people. I chose not to depart from principle for the sake of expediency in the Lecompton question, and I never intend to do it on that or any other question. (Good.)
But I am told that I would have been all right if I had only voted for the English bill after Lecompton was killed. (Laughter and cheers.) You know a general pardon was granted to all political offenders on the Lecompton question, provided they would only vote for the English bill. I did not accept the benefits of that pardon, for the reason that I had been right in the course I had pursued, and hence did not require any forgiveness. Let us see how the result has beon worked out. English brought in his bill referring the Lecompton Constitution back to the people, with the provision that if it was rejected Kansas should be kept out of the Union until she had the full ratio of population required for a member of Congress, thus in effect declaring that if the people of Kansas would only consent to come into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution, and have a slave State when they did not want it, they should be admitted with a population of 35,000, but that if they were so obstinate as to insist upon having just such a constitution as a free State, then they should be kept out until they had 93,420 inhabitants. I then said, and I now repeat tO you, that whenever Kansas has people enough for a slave State she has people enough for a free State. (“That’s the doctrine all over,” “Hurrah for Douglas.”) I was and am willing to adopt the rule that no State shall ever come into the Union until she has the full ratio of population for a member of Congress, provided that rule is made uniform. I made that proposition in the Senate last winter, but a majority of the Senators would not agree to it; and I then said to them if you will not adopt the general rule I will not consent to make an exception of Kansas.
I hold that it is a violation of the fundamental principles of this government to throw the weight of federal power into the scale, either in favor of the free or the slave States. Equality among all the States of this Union is a fundamental principle in our political system. We have no more right to throw the weight of the federal government into the scale in favor of the slaveholding than the free States, and last of all should our friends in the South consent for a moment that Congress should withhold its powers either way when they know that there is a majority against them in both Houses of Congress.
Fellow citizens, how have the supporters of the English bill stood up to their pledges not to admit Kansas until she obtained a population of 93,420 in the event she rejected the Lecompton constitution? How? The newspapers inform us that English himself, whilst conducting his canvass for re-election, and in order to secure it, pledged himself to his constituents that if returned he would disregard his own bill and vote to admit Kansas into the Union with such population as she might have when she made application. (Laughter and applause.) We are informed that every Democratic candidate for Congress in all the States where elections have recently been held, was pledged against the English bill, with perhaps one or two exceptions. Now, if I had only done as these Anti-Lecompton men who voted for the English bill in Congress, pledging themselves to refuse to admit Kansas if she refused to become a slave State until she had a population of 93,420, and then returned to their people, forfeited their pledge, and made a new pledge to admit Kansas at any time she applied, without regard to population, I would have had no trouble. You saw the whole power and patronage of the federal government wielded in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania to re-elect Anti-Lecompton men to Congress who voted against Lecompton, then voted for the English bull, and then denounced the En lish bill, and pledged themselves to their people to disregard it. (Good.) My sin consists in not having given a pledge, and then in not having afterwards forfeited it. For that reason, in this State, every postmaster, every route agent, every collector of the ports, and every federal office holder, forfeits his head the moment he expresses a preference for the Democratic candidates against Lincoln and his abolition associates. (That’s so, and cheers.) A Democratic Administration which we helped to bring to power, deems it consistent with its fidelity to principle and its regard to duty, to wield its power in this State in behalf of the Republican abolition candidates in every county and every Congressional district against the Democratic party. All I have to say in reference to the matter is, that if that administration have not regard enough for principle, if they are not sufficiently attached to the creed of the Democratic party to bury forever their personal hostilities in order to succeeed in carrying out our glorious principles, I have. (Good, good, and cheers.) I have no personal difficulties with Mr. Buchanan or his cabinet. He chose to make certain recommendations to Congress as he had a right to do on the Lecompton question. I could not vote in favor of them. I had as much right to judge for myself how I should vote as he had how he should recommend. He undertook to say to me, if you do not vote as I tell you, I will take off the heads of your friends. (Laughter.) I replied to him, “you did not elect me, I represent Illinois and I am accountable to Illinois, as my constituency, and to God, but not to the President or to any other power on earth. (Good, good, and vociferous applause.)
And now this warfare is made on me because I would not surrender my connections of duty, because I would not abandon my constituency, and receive the order of the executive authorities how I should vote in the Senate of the United States. (“Never do it,” “three cheers,” &c.) I hold that an attempt to control the Senate on the part of the Executive is subversive of the principles of our constitution. (“That’s right.”) The Executive department is independent of the Senate, and the Senate is independent of the President. In matters of legislation the President has a veto on the action of the Senate, and in appointments and treaties the Senate has a veto on the President. He has no more right to tell me how to I shall vote on his appointments that I have to tell him whether he shall veto or approve a bill that the Senate has passed. Whenever you recognize the right of the Executive to say to a Senator, “do this, or I will take off the heads of your friends,” you convert this government from a republic into a despotism. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) Whenever you recognize the rights of a President to say to a member of Congress, “vote as I tell, or I will bring a power to bear against you at home which will crush you,” you destroy the independence of the representative, and convert him into a tool of Executive power. (“That’s so, and applause.) I resisted this invasion of the constitutional rights of a Senator, and I intend to resist it as long as I have a voice to speak, or a vote to give. Yet, Mr. Buchanan cannot provoke me to abandon one iota of Democratic principles out of revenge or hostility to his course. (“Good, good, three cheers for Douglas.”) I stand by the platform of the Democratic party, and by its organization, and support its nominees. If there are any who choose to bolt, the fact only shows that they are not as good Democrats as I am. (“That’s so, “good,” and applause.)
My friends, there never was a time when it was as important for the Democratic party, for all national men, to rally and stand together as it is to-day. We find all sectional men giving up past differences and continuing the one question of slavery, and when we find sectional men thus uniting, we should unite to resist them and their treasonable designs. Such was the case in 1850, when Clay left the quiet and peace of his home, and again entered upon public life to quell agitation and restore peace to a distracted Union. Then we Democrats, with Cass at our head, welcomed Henry Clay, whom the whole nation regarded as having been preserved by God for the times. He became our leader in that great fight, and we rallied around him the same as the Whigs rallied around old Hickory in 1832, to put down nullification. (Cheers.) Thus you see that whilst Whigs and Democrats fought fearlessly in old times about banks, the tariffs, distribution, the specie circular, and the sub treasury, all united as a band of brothers when the peace, harmony, or integrity of the Union was imperiled. (Tremendous applause.) It was so in 1850, when abolitionism had even so far divided this country, North and South, as to endanger the peace of the Union; Whigs and Democrats united in establishing the compromise measures of that year, and restoring tranquillity and good feeling. These measures passed on the joint action of th two parties. They rested on the great principle that the people of each State and each territory should be left perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves. You Whigs and we Democrats justified them in that principle. In 1854, when it became necessary to organize the territories of Kansas and Nebraska, I brought forward the bill on the same principle. In the Kansas-Nebraska bill you find it declared to be the true intent and meaning of the act not to legislate slavery into any State or territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way. (“That’s so” and cheers.) I stand on that same platform in 1858 that I did in 1850, 1854, and 1856. The Washington Union, pretending to be the organ of the Administration, in the number of the 5th of this month, devotes three columns and a half to establish these propositions: First, that Douglas, in his Freeport speech, held the same doctrine that he did in his Nebraska bill in 1854; second, that in 1854 Douglas justified the Nebraska bill upon the ground that it was based upon the same principle as Clay’s compromise measures of 1850. The Union thus proved that Douglas was the same in 1858 that he was in 1856, 1854, and 1850, and consequently argued that he was never a Democrat. (Great laughter.) Is it not funny that I was never a Democrat? (Renewed laughter.) There is no pretense that I have changed a hair’s breath. The Union proves by my speeches that I explained the compromise measures of 1850 just as I do now, and that I explained the Kansas and Nebraska bill in 1854 just as I did in my Freeport speech, and yet says that I am not a Democrat, and cannot be trusted, because I have not changed during the whole of that time. It has occurred to me that in 1854 the author of the Kansas and Nebraska bill was considered a pretty good Democrat. (Cheers.) It has occurred to me that in 1856, when I was exerting every nerve and every energy for James Buchanan, standing on the same platform then that I do now, that I was a pretty good Democrat. (Renewed applause.) They now tell me that I am not a Democrat, because I assert that the people of a territory, as well as those of a State, have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery can or can not exist in such territory. Let me read what James Buchanan said on that point when he accepted the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1856. In his letter of acceptance, he used the following language:
“The recent legislation of Congress respecting domestic slavery, derived as it has been from the original and pure foundation of legitimate political power, the will of the majority, promises ere long to allay the dangerous excitement. This legislation is founded upon the principles as ancient as free government itself, and in accordance with them has simply declared that the people of a territory like those of a state, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist withing their limits.
Dr. Hope will there find my answer to the question he propounded to me before I commenced speaking. (Vociferous shouts of applause.) Of course no man will consider it an answer, who is outside of the Democratic organization, bolts Democratic nomination, and indirectly aids to put abolitionists into power over Democrats. But whether Dr. Hope considers it an answer or not, every fair minded man will see that James Buchanan has answered the question, and has asserted that the people of a territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. I answer specifically if you want a further answer, and say that while under the decision of the Supreme Court, as recorded in the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, slaves are property like all other property and can be carried into territory of the United States the same as any other description of property, yet when you get them there they are subject to the local law of the territory just like all other property. You will find in a recent speech delivered by that able and eloquent statesman, Hon. Jefferson Davis, at Bangor, Maine, that he took the same view of this subject that I did in my Freeport speech. He there said:
“If the inhabitants of any territory should refuse to enact such laws and police regulations as would give security to their property or to his, it would be rendered more or less valueless, in proportion to the difficulties of holding it without such protection. In the case of property in the labor of man, or what is usually called slave property, the insecurity would be so great that the owner could not ordinarily retain it. Therefore, though the right would remain, the remedy being withheld, it would follow that the owner would be practically debarred, by the circumstances of the case, from taking slave property into a territory where the sense of the inhabitants was opposed to its introduction. So much for the oft r peated fallacy of forcing slavery upon any community.”
You will also find that the distinguished Speaker of the present House of Representatives, Hon. Jas. L. Orr, construed the Kansas and Nebraska bill in this same way in 1856, and also that great intellect of the South, Alex. H. Stephens, put the same construction upon it in Congress that I did in my Freeport speech. The whole South are rallying to support the doctrine that if the people of a Territory want slavery they have a right to have it, and if they do not want it that no power on earth can force it upon them. I hold that there is no principle on earth more sacred to all the friends of freedom than that which says that no institution, no law, no constitution, should be forced on a unwilling people contrary to their wishes; and I assert that the Kansas and Nebraska bill contains that principle. It is the great principle contained in that bill. It is the principle on which James Buchanan was made President. Without that principle he never would have been made President of the United States, I will never violate or abandon that doctrine if I have to stand alone. (Hurrah for Douglas.) I have resisted the blandishments and threats of power on the one side, and seduction on the other, and have stood immovably for that principle, fighting for it when assailed by Northern mobs or threatened by Southern hostility. (“That’s the truth,” and cheers.) I have defended it against the North and the South, and I will defend it against whoever assails it, and I will follow it wherever its logical conclusions lead me. (“So will we all,” “hurrah for Douglas.”) I say to you that there is but one hope, one safety for this country, and that is to stand immovably by that principle which declares the right of each State and each territory to decide these questions for themselves. (Hear him, hear him.) This government was founded on that principle, and must be administered in the same sense in which it was founded.
But the Abolition party really think that under the Declaration of Independence the negro is equal to the white man, and that negro equality is an inalienable right conferred by the Almighty, and hence, that all human laws in violation of it are null and void. With such men it is no use for me to argue. I hold that the signers of the Declaration of Independence had no reference to negroes at all when they declared all men to be created equal. They did not mean negro, nor the savage Indians, nor the Fejee Islanders, nor any other barbarous race. They were speaking of white men. (“It’s so,” “it’s so,” and cheers.) They alluded to men of European birth and European descent—to white men, and to none others, when they declared that doctrine. (“That’s the truth.”) I hold that this government was established on the white basis. It was established by white men for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men, and none others. But it does not follow, by any means, that merely because the negro is not a citizen, and merely because he is not our equal, that, therefor, he should be a slave. On the contrary, it does follow, that we ought to extend to the negro race, and to all other dependent races all the rights, all the privileges, and all the immunities which they can exercise consistently with the safety of society. Humanity requires that we should give them all these privileges; christianity commands that we should extend those privileges to them. The question then arises what are those privileges, and what is the nature and extent of them. My answer is that that is a question which each State must answer for itself. We in Illinois have decided it for ourselves. We tried slavery, kept it up for twelve years, and finding that it was not profitable we abolished it for that reason, and became a free State. We adopted in its stead the policy that a negro in this State shall not be a slave and shall not be a citizen. We have a right to adopt that policy. For my party I think it is a wise and sound policy for us. You in Missouri must judge for yourselves whether it is a wise policy for you. If you choose to follow our example, very good; if you reject it, still well, it is your business, not ours. So with Kentucky. Let Kentucky adopt a policy to suit herself. If we do not like it we will keep away from it, and if she does not like ours let her stay at home, mind her own business and let us alone. If the people of all the States will act on that great principle, and each State mind its own business, attend to its own affairs, take care of its own negroes and not meddle with its neighbors, then there will be peace between the North and the South, the East and the West, throughout the whole Union. (Cheers.) Why can we not thus have peace? Why should we thus allow a sectional party to agitate this country, to array the North against the South, and convert us into enemies instead of friend, merely that, a few ambitious men may ride into power on a sectional hobby? How long is it since these ambitious Northern men wished for a sectional organization? Did any one of them dream of a sectional party as long as the North was the weaker section and the South the stronger? Then all were opposed to sectional parties; but the moment the North obtained the majority in the House and Senate by the admission of California, and could elect a President without the aid of Southern votes, that moment ambitious Northern men formed a scheme to excite the North against the South, and make the people be governed in their votes by geographical lines, thinking that the North, being the stronger section, would outvote the South, and consequently they, the leaders, would ride into office on a sectional hobby. I am told that my hour is out. It was very short.
Cheers after cheer rose in the air for Douglas when he took his seat, and it was some time before sufficient silence could be restored to allow Mr. Lincoln to proceed.
REMARKS OF MR. LINCOLN.
As Mr. Lincoln arose, there was a great confusion of cries and cheering. Among other cries we heard many “hurrahs for Douglas,” with “cheers for Lincoln,” and cries of “give him a chance,” “let him have a sight,” “hurrah for Lincoln,” etc. The noise having somewhat subsided, Mr. L.[Lincoln] proceeded to say:
Ladies and Gentlemen:
a voice:—There are no ladies here.
Mr. Lincoln:—You are mistaken about that. There is a fine chance of them back here. (Laughter.)
I have been somewhat, in my own mind, complimented by a large portion of Judge Douglas’ speech — by that portion of it which he addressed to the controversy between himself and the present Administration. (Laughter, and cries of “hurrah for Lincoln,” and “hurrah for Douglas.”) This is the seventh time that Judge Douglas and I have met in these joint discussions, and the Judge, upon that subject, has been gradually improving. (A voice, “that is so,” and laughter.) In regard to his war with the Administration at Quincy last Wednesday — the day before yesterday — the Judge was a little more severe upon the Administration that I had heard him be upon any former occasion, and I complimented him for it, and I told him that I altogether commended him to a most vigorous prosecution of that war. I told him to give it to them with all the power he had; and, as some of them were sitting there present, I told them I would be much obliged to them if they would give it to him in about the same way; and I felt that as he h s vastly improved upon the attack that he made then, that he has really taken my advice upon the subject, all I can say now is to recommend to him and to them what I then commended, to him and them — the prosecution of the war in the most vigorous style. I say, “go it husband and go it bear.”
There is one thing, however, that I will mention before I leave this branch of the subject, although I do not consider that it is much of my business any how, and that is where the Judge undertakes to involve Mr. Buchanan in an inconsistency. He reads something from Mr. Buchanan, and undertakes to involve him in an inconsistency, and he gets something of a cheer on doing so. I would only say to the Judge, now that he is valiantly fighting for the Nebraska bill and the repeal of the Missouri compromise, that it is but a little while since he was the valiant advocate of the Missouri compromise. (A voice — “That’s so!”) Now I want to know if Mr. Buchanan has not as much right to be inconsistent as has Judge Douglas? Has Judge Douglas an exclusive right to be inconsistent? Has he a monopoly upon that subject?
So far as Judge Douglas has addressed his speech to me, or about me, it is my business to pay some attention to it. I have heard the Judge two or three times state what he stated to-day — that in a speech which I had made at Springfield, Illinois, I had in a very special manner complained that the Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott decision, had decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States. I have omitted heretofore by some-sort of accident to notice that statement of the Judge. It has recurred to my memory to notice it now. In point of fact it is untrue as the Judge stated it. I never have complained of the Dred Scott decision because it decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States. I have the speech here, and I will thank him or any of his friends to find where I specially complained of the decision because it decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States. I have done no such thing! Judge Douglas’ persistency in insisting that I have done so, has strongly impressed me with the belief of a predetermination on his part of misrepresent me. He could not get his foundation for insisting that I was in favor of negro equality anywhere else so well as in assuming that in regard to me.
Let me tell this audience what is true in regard to this, and the means by which they can correct me if I shall not correctly state it myself, to wit: by reference to the speech itself, I was endeavoring to prove that the Dred Scott decision was a portion of a system to make slavery national in the United States. I pointed out in that speech what points had been decided in that decision by the court. I mentioned that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen, as a fact, and I mentioned that they had done so, as I supposed, to deprive the negro of all power of ever becoming a citizen, and claiming the rights of a citizen of the United States under a certain clause of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. I stated that, without making any complaint of it at all. I adduced what other points they had decided, that the bringing of a slave in the State of Illinois, and holding him for two years, was a matter that they would not decide as to whether it would make him free or not; that they decided that taking him into a territory of the United States, where an act of Congress had made it free, did not make him free because the act was unconstitutional. I mentioned all these in a lump, and taken in connection with the Nebraska bill and the amendment of Chase, explanatory of the pretended objects of the bill, offered at the time, which was voted down by the friends of the bill, and combing these things together and offering them, I argued that they tended to prove a combination or conspiracy, tending to make the institution of slavery national in the United States.
In that connection, and in that way, I mentioned the decision that a negro could not be a citizen of the United States. Now, out of that Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabric of my purpose to introduce a perfect, political, and social equality between the whites and the negroes, always adding, what is not true, that I made special objection that the decision said that a negro could not be a citizen of the United States.
As this has been alluded to, and as Mr. Clay has been alluded to, I desire to place myself in connection with him, before this people as nearly right as I may. I know what is the object of Judge Douglas here to-day; he knows that we are before an audience with strong sympathies by birth, education, and otherwise, with the South, he desires, therefore, to place me in a strong Abolition attitude. He reads on former occasions, and alludes to-day without reading, to a portion of a speech which I made at Chicago. In his quotations as he made them on former occasions, which were quotations made, as I suppose, bringing them within what is called garbling, that is to say, taking portions of a speech which when presented do not present the entire sense of the speaker as expressed at that time. I propose, therefore, out of that same speech from which he has presented some extracts upon former occasions, and to which he alludes to-day without presenting extracts, to show you an extract which he skipped over — one before it and one after it — leaving the portion he has alluded to out. It will take me some little time, but still I think that I will occupy the time in that way.
You have heard him t0-day frequently allude to my controversy with him in regard to the Declaration of Independence. I confess to you that I have had a struggle with Judge Douglas in the way of argument in regard to that matter, and I will try to place myself right in regard to it briefly on this occasion. I said — and it is between these extracts that Judge Douglas has taken his extracts and put them in his published speeches — I said:
“It may be argued that there are certain conditions that make necessities and impress them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon a man that he must submit to it. I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this government. We had slavery among us — we could not get our constitution unless we permitted them to remain in slavery — we could not secure the good we did secure if we grasped for more, and having by necessity submitted to that much, it does not destroy the principle that is the charter of our liberties. Let that character stand as our standard.”
Now, I have clearly and upon all occasions declared, as strongly as Judge Douglas, that we have no right to interfere with the institution of slavery where it exists. You hear me read that from the same speech that he takes garbled extracts from, for the purpose of proving me to be inclined to establish perfect political and social equality between the whites and the negroes.
Let me show one other extract from a speech of mine made a year ago — more than a year ago at Springfield, in discussing this very same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his ground that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence. I said several things, some of which I will read. I said then:
“I think the author of that noble instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size or intellect, moral development or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respect they did consider all men created equal — equal with ‘certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free men, which should be familiar to all and revered by all, constantly looked to and constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.”
There again are the sentiments that I have expressed in regard to the Declaration of Independence, upon a former occasion, which have been put in print, and have been read everywhere that anybody cared to know anything about what so humble an individual as myself might say in regard to it.
At Galesburg, the other day, I said in my speech, in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years ago there had never been a man, so far as I knew or believed, in the whole world that had declared that the Declaration of Independence did not mean the negro; that the term “all men” in the Declaration of Independence did not include the negro. I reassert that to-day; I assert to-day, that Judge Douglas and all his friends may search the whole of the records of the country, and it will be a matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that any one human being on earth, three years ago, had ever uttered that, to me, astounding sentiment, that the term “all men” does not include the negro.
Do not let me be misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men that, finding that old documents standing in their way in regard to their purpose of extending slavery, denied the truth of it — I know that Mr. Calhoun and the politicians of his school, more than three years ago, denied the truth of it — I know that it ran along through the mouths of several for years, ending in that rather coarse expression, as I have heard it, of Pettit of Indiana, on the floor of the United States Senate, that the Declaration of Independence, in that respect, was a self-evident lie, rather than a self-evident truth; but I say still, that it is my opinion that three years ago there never had lived the man, who ventured in the sneaking way of pretending to believe in the Declaration then to say, that it did not mean to include the negro. I believe the first man that ever said that was Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him, was our friend Judge Douglas, (cries of “Good for Douglas,” and applause,) and now it is becoming the catch word of the entire party. I would like to call upon Judge Douglas’ friends everywhere to consider how they have come to view that matter in so short a time, so entirely different from any view that they had of it before, and to consider whether, really, they are not being carried along in a current, whither they know not.
But in answer to this presentation of this proposition of mine at Galesburg last week, I see that some man in Chicago has gotten up a letter, addressed to the Chicago Times, to show, as he believes, that somebody had said so before, and he signs his name to his letter “An Old Line Whig,” as I remember it. Now, in the first place, I say that he was not an old line Whig. I am somewhat acquainted with the old line Whigs — I was with the old line Whigs from the origin of that party to the end of it, and I am somewhat acquainted with it, and I know that there is no one of them but had more sense than to attempt to prove that, prior to the time I said, any one had said that a negro was not included in the term “all men” by such evidence as he produced.
I will reproduce his evidence. He brings forward part of a speech of Henry Clay, and the part of a speech from Henry Clay which I would myself bring forward to prove the contrary. Now, let us read that portion of Henry Clay’s speech. I guess we are surrounded in some part here by old friends of Henry Clay, and they like to hear anything from him. (A voice — “Henry Clay was a mighty good man.”) In Indiana a man had presented a petition to Mr. Clay to liberate his negroes, and Mr. Clay made a speech in answer to him, wh ch I suppose he carefully wrote out himself, and which was published, and which I have before me, and an extract from that speech is the evidence which this pretended old line Whig brought forward to prove what he asserted in contradiction of what I have asserted:
“And what is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana to liberate the slaves under my care in Kentucky? It is a general declaration in the act annonncing to the world the independence of the thirteen American colonies, that all men are created equal. Now, as an abstract principle, there is no doubt of the truth of that declaration, and it is desirable, in the original construction of society, and in organized societies, to keep it in view, as a great fundamental principle. But then, I apprehend that in no society that ever did exist, or ever shall be formed, was or can the equality asserted among the members of the human race be practically enforced and carried out. There are portions of it, large portions, women, minors, insane, culprits, transient sojourners, that will always probably remain subject to the government of another portion of the community.
That declaration, whatever may be the extent of its import, was made by the delegations of the thirteen States. In most of them slavery existed and had long existed, and was established by law. It was introduced and forced upon the colonies by the paramount law of England. Do you believe that, in making that declaration, the States that concurred in it intended that it should be tortured into a virtual emancipation of all the slaves within their respective limits?— Would Virginia and the older Southern States have ever united in a declaration which was to be interpreted into an abolition of slavery among them? Did any one of the thirteen States entertain such a design or expectation? To impute such a secret and unavowed purpose would be to charge a political fraud upon the noblest band of patriots that ever assembled in council — a fraud upon the union of those States, whose Constitution not only recognized the lawfulness of slavery, but permitted the importation of slaves from Africa until the year 1808.”
This is the entire quotation that was brought forward for the purpose of proving that somebody had said, prior to three years ago, that the term “all men” in the Declaration of Independence did not include negroes. How does it do it? What tendency has it to prove it? Mr. Clay says, it is true, that we cannot practically apply it in all cases, and he illustrates by bringing forward the case of females, minors, insane, culprits, and so on, but he says that it is true as an abstract principle, and it is desirable in the formation of new societies, and even in organized societies, that it should be constantly kept in view as an abstract principle.
Let me add a few words more which was not brought in. Mr. Clay says, a little further on:
“I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental government, and from our ancestors. I wish every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors. But here they are, and the question is, how they can be best dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements.”
These were the sentiments of Henry Clay, he say, “if a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundation of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements.” Now, we have in this same book, this same speech that is brought forward for the purpose of trying to prove that Mr. Clay said prior to three years ago, that the negro was not intended in the Declaration of Independence no such statement at all; but we have the declaration that it is a great fundamental principle that should be constantly kept in view in the organization of new societies, and in societies already organized, that all men are created equal. But, if I say a word about it — if I attempt, as Mr. Clay said that all good men should do, to keep it in view — if I ask in relation to the organization of new societies that the public eye should be turned upon it, forthwith I am villified everywhere.
What have I done in regard to the Declaration of Independence that I have not the license of Henry Clay to do? Have I done aught in reverence to the organization of new societies, and in this organized society, but as he recommended, of holding up to public view that grand fundamental principle of free society? (Applause.) And when the new principle — this new proposition that no human being every thought of three years ago is brought forward, I combat it as having an evil tendency, if not an evil design; combat it as having a tendency to dis-humanize the man, to take away from him all right to be supposed or considered as human; I combat it, therefore, as being one of the thousand and one things doing in these days for the purpose of preparing the public mind for making property and nothing but property of the negro in all the States of this Union. (Applause, and cries of “Hurrah for Lincoln!” and “Hurrah for Douglas!”)
But there is a point that I wish, before leaving this, to ask your attention further to, which I have read, but I wish again to pass over it, to ask your attention to it. Mr. Clay says:
“I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental government and from our ancestors. I wish every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors. But here they are, and the question is how they can be best dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements.”
Now, then, the principle that I had insisted upon, and all the principle that I have insisted upon, from the Declaration of Independence, as applicable to this discussion and this canvass, is in relation to laying the foundations of new societies. I have never sought to apply this principle to those old States where slavery exists for the purpose of abolishing slavery in those States. It is nothing but gross perversion to assume that I have brought forth the Declaration of Independence to ask that Missouri shall free her slaves. I will propose no such thing at all; but when Mr. Clay says that in laying the foundations of new societies he would be opposed to the introduction of this element, I insist that in the speech of Mr. Clay we have his warrant, his license, for insisting upon the exclusion of that element which he declared in such strong and emphatic language was most hateful to him. (Cries of “good” and some applause, and a voice — “We want white men; we don’t want niggers.”)
Judge Douglas, in this connection, has referred to a Springfield speech of mine, in which I said, “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” Now, if you please, I will address myself for a little while to something that springs from that Springfield speech. The Judge has often made the entire quotation from that speech, and I can make it myself. I used this language:
We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was instituted for the avowed object and with the confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy the agitation has not only ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. ‘A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will the arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward until it becomes alike lawful in all the States — old as well as new, North as well as South.”
That quotation, and the sentiment expressed in it, have been extremely offensive to Judge Douglas. He was warred upon them as Satan does upon the Bible. He has never given it up, and his perversions upon it are endless. Now, hear my views for a little while in regard to that same thing. I said that we were “now far into the fifth year since a policy was instituted for the avowed object, and with the confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation.” Is not that so? When did the Nebraska bill come forward? Four years ago the fourth day of January last, and we are far into the fifth year since then. Was not the avowed object of that bill to put an end to slavery agitation? We were to have no more agitation of the slavery question in Congress, no more in the States, and it was all to be confined to the territories. But here I will remark, as Judge Douglas is very fond of complimenting Mr. Crittenden about this time, that he said that there was a falsehood in it, that there was no slavery agitation at the time the bill was introduced, and that the bill was itself the means of stirring it up again. (Applause.) But was it not introduced with the purpose and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation? Why, every speech that he (Douglas) made until he got into the imbroglio, I believe you call it, with the administration, was to the effect that it was the purpose of that bill to put an end to the agitation of the question of slavery — that the last kink of its tail was just drawing out of sight. I have said that “under the operation of that policy, that agitation has only not ceased, but has constantly augmented.” Is not that true? When was that agitation so great as to-day?
There was a collateral object which was to clothe the people of the territory with a power they had never had before. The first and main object of putting an end to slavery agitation had not succeeded. The second and collateral one of conferring a higher degree of self-government is a question of fact to be determined by you, in answer to a question that I will put to you now: have you ever known of a people on the face of the earth that ever had as little to do with the application of this principle as in the first instance of its use, the people of Kansas, in the application of this same right of self-government in its main and collateral objects? It has been nothing but a living, creeping lie from the time of its introduction to this day. (Applause.)
But I have said that “the agitation,” as I think, “will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed.” I have said in what way I suppose that crisis may be reached and passed. I have said that it may go one way or the other. I have said that it may be passed by arresting the further spread of it, and by bringing the public mind to rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction, and I have said, and I repeat, that my wish is that the further spread of it should be arrested, and that it should be placed where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction. (Applause). I have expressed that as my wish, and I have no disposition to shrink from it, but I have a disposition to be not misrepresented about it. I have a disposition to not have it believed by any honest man that I desire to go to war with Missouri. Not at all! I entertain the opinion upon evidence sufficient to my mind, that the fathers of this government placed the institution of slavery among them when the public mind did rest in the belief that it was in course of ultimate extinction. Let me ask you, if they did not, why did they make provision that the source of slavery — the African slave trade — might be cut off at the end of twenty years? Why did they make provision that in all the territories that were held at that time slavery should be inhibited? Why cut it off in one direction, and prevent its spread in another, if it was not that they placed in the course of ultimate extinction? In the Constitution slavery is but referred to three times, and covert language is then used, as I suppose. What is the language in regard to the prohibition of the slave trade? It runs in this way:
“The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”
The next allusion in the constitution to the institution of slavery and the black race, as I suppose, is as to the basis of representation, and there the language that they use is:
“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians, not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.”
No negro mentioned — no slaves mentioned, but the “three-fifths of all other persons” can be applied to no other class of persons, among us, and did mean slaves. Lastly, the provisions for the reclamation of fugitive slaves. There it is said:
“No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another shall, in consequence of any law or regulation thereof, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the parties to whom such service or labor may be due.”
There again there is no mention of the negro, or of slavery. In all three of these places, being the only allusions in the constitution to the institution of slavery at all, — covert language is used — language is used not at all suggestive that slavery exists, or, that the black race of people is among us, and I understand the cotemporaneous history of the times to be, that that language was used with a purpose, and that purpose was that our constitution, which, it was hoped — and it is still read by intellectual men — that there should be nothing on the face of that instrument that should suggest to the mind that we have negro slavery among us. This being so, this is part of the evidence that the fathers of the government intended and expected the institution to come to an end. They expected and intended that it was, as they placed it, in the course of ultimate extinction, and when I say that I desire to see the further spread of it arrested, I only say that I desire to see that thing done that they then did; when I say that I desire to see it placed where the public mind will rest in the belief of its ultimate extinction, I only say that I desire to see it placed where they placed it.
It is not true, so far as I may understand it, that our fathers, as Judge Douglas assumes it, that our fathers made this government part slave, and part free. It is not true that they made it so in the sense that Judge Douglas put it.
He assumes that slavery, as a rightful thing within itself, was introduced by the framers of our Constitution. In that sense, then, it is not true that the framers of our Constitution made this government part slave and part free. The exact truth is that they found the institution existing among us and they left it as they found it, not making it so, with a thousand marks of disapprobation upon it. It is not true, as assumed, that our fathers made it so, but they found it that way and they left it among us, because of the difficulties and absolute impossibility of the immediate removal of it, and when Judge Douglas turns and asks me why it is that we cannot let it remain as our fathers made it, he asks a question based upon an assumption which is itself a falsehood, and I turn upon him and ask him when he found that policy which the fathers of the government had adopted — this policy among us, the best policy in the world, and the only policy that we can ever get upon that shall give us peace, unless it masters us all and puts us down, and becomes a lawful institution alike everywhere? I turn upon him and ask him why he could not leave it alone? (Applause.) I turn and ask him what is the reason he was driven to the necessity — what was the reason he was pressed to the necessity of introducing a new policy in regard to the matter, as he has himself said that he introduced a new policy — as he so said in his speech of 22d March, 1858?
I ask only in this controversy that we shall again place this institution upon the basis that our fathers placed it upon; I ask no more than that, and now I ask you, where he infers that I am in favor of setting the slaves and free States at war, the one with the other; does he not do me injustice? The institution being placed in that attitude by those who made the Constitution, did it make war? If we had no war when it was thus placed, where is the ground of belief that we shall have war upon returning to that policy? I have proposed nothing more than this!
Now, I confess very frankly that when I propose a certain measure of policy, that it is not enough for me to show that I do not intend a wicked and evil purpose; I have to show that it has not a tendency to that result. I have tried to show this by fair reasoning, and I think, in the minds of fair, reasoning men, I have shown that I propose nothing other that has a most peaceful tendency.
It is part and parcel of the same thing, the quotation which I, in that Springfield speech, happened to make, that “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” That is exceedingly offensive to Judge Douglas. It is but part and parcel of the same thing. He tries to illustrate that variety in the different institutions of the several States is indispensible. I shall readily agree with him, that it would be very foolish in us to insist upon having a cranberry law in Illinois, where we have no cranberries, because they have one in Indiana, where they have cranberries. I should think it would be very foolish in us to insist that Virginia has no right to have an oyster law because we don’t want an oyster law. I understand that the variety in soil, climate, in the face of the country, and consequent variety in the people and institutions of the country, and further consequent variety in legislation, are vast advantages. I understand as well as he, I repeat, that if we raise a barrel of flour more than we want, and Louisiana raises a barrel of sugar more than she wants, that it is a material advantage to both of us that we exchange them, it makes a mutual commerce, it makes us better friends, it brings us together, and I understand that these differences and varieties are the cement in part that bind this Union together, and instead of being things that divide the house, and tend to throw it down, they are the props tending strongly to hold it up; but when I have said all this, I ask if there is any parallel between these things and the institution of slavery among us? I ask if there is any parallel at all between the things? I ask you to consider well if we have any difficulty or quarrel among ourselves about the cranberry laws of Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or about the timber laws of Maine and New Hampshire, or about the fact that Louisiana produces sugar and we produce flour and not sugar. When have we have quarrels about these things? Never so such thing. On the other hand, when have we had perfect peace in regard to this thing, which I say is an element of discord in this nation? We have sometimes had peace, and when was that? We have had peace whenever the institution of slavery remained quiet where it was, and we have had turmoil and difficulty whenever it has made a struggle to spread out where it was not. I ask, then, if experience does not teach, if it does not speak in thunder tones, that that policy that gives peace being returned to, gives promise of peace again.
You may say, and Judge Douglas may say, that all that is said in regard to slavery is the mere agitation of office seekers, — of northern men that want to get his place, I suppose. I agree that there is selfishness enough among office seekers. We are desperately selfish, I believe the Bible says, somewhere, and I believe that I should have discovered that fact if the Bible had not said it. I am not less selfish than other men, but I do claim that I am not more selfish than is Judge Douglas.
But is it new that all this agitation in regard to the subject of slavery springs from mere office-seekers? How many cases of dangerous agitation have we had from that question? You go back to the Missouri compromise; to the compromise on the nullification question — at the bottom of which was this same slavery question; go back to the difficulties of the Texas annexation; go back to the difficulties of the times of the compromise of 1850, and you will find that the agitation sprang up upon the struggle of slavery to extend itself. But further, does it make disturbance no where but in political circles? Does it not enter into the church, please? What divided the great Methodist Church, North and South? What makes the disturbance in every Presbyterian General Assembly that gets together? What made the disturbance in this city a few years ago in the Unitarian church? What set them by the ears in the great American Tract Society, not splitting it yet but surely to split it? Is this the thing that so operates upon the minds of men as to stir them up in all the relations of life, not merely in the political world, but in the moral and religious; is that, however, to be assuaged by pretending that it is an exceedingly small thing and that we ought to quit talking about it? Why, if you will get everybody else to quit talking about it I will quit before you have half done.
But where is the statesmanship in saying that you can quiet that disturbing element menacing us with the only danger to our Union — where is the philosophy and statesmanship that rests upon the belief that we are to say and care nothing about it. This policy here in the North, here with Judge Douglas, at the head of which he stands, is based upon the idea that we are to care nothing about it. (A voice, “that is true.”) Now, I ask if it is not a false philosophy and false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of caring nothing about a thing that everybody does care a great deal about, — that all experience has shown that everybody does care a great deal about.
The Judge alludes very often in the course of his remarks to allowing the thing to be decided exclusively by the different States for themselves. I agree very readily that the different States have that right. He is but fighting a man of straw when he assumes that I am contending against the right of the States to do as they please about it. Our controversy with him is as to the new territory. We agree that when the States come in as States, they have entire power to do as they please about the question. We profess that we, as citizens of a free State — as members of the confederation, through the general government have no power to disturb it where it is; and we profess that we have no more inclination than power to disturb it in those States; yet we are compelled to defend ourselves against the assumption that we are waring upon [it?] in the States.
We insist that it shall be kept from the territories. Judge Douglas insists that we have no right to say anything about that; but I think that have some interest in that as white men. Do we not wish that our surplus population may have some outlet to go to? Do we not feel an interest, in going in to that outlet that such institutions shall prevail as are pleasing to us? and it is not the sort of thing that can be divided. If you go to a new territory opposed to slavery, and another man goes there with slaves, as equals, it turns out that he has it all his way, and you have no part in the matter. A few going into a territory with their slaves make it a slave territory, and consequently a slave State.
Now, let me suggest this thing in another way. How may Democrats are here?
A Voice— A thousand and one! (Laughter.)
Mr.LincolnHow many Democrats have professed to come into the State of Illinois, pretending that they desired to get rid of slavery? I guess that there are a thousand and one of that sort. (Applause:) Now, I will ask if your policy had prevailed in a time when this country had been in a state of existence similar to the territories to-day, where you would have gone to? And when hereafter, for any cause, the free people of these States shall desire to find new homes — an outlet — if they wish to be rid of the institution of slavery, where will they find the place to go to? Now, irrespective of the moral question — irrespective of the question as to whether there be right or wrong in enslaving the negro, I am still in favor of the new territory being kept free, into which free white men may move, fix their homes and better their conditions in life. I am in favor of that, — not merely — I must say it here as I say it elsewhere — not merely for our own people that are born among us, but I am in favor of an outlet for the free white people, for new homes in which all free white men from all the world may find place, and better their condition in life. (Applause.)
I have stated upon former occasions, and I may as well do so again, what I understand to be the real issue in this controversy.
There has been no issue between Judge Douglas and I on the point of my wanting to make war between the free and slave States. I may pass that. There has been no issue between Judge Douglas and I on the ground of my wanting to introduce a perfect social and political equality between the white and colored races. These are false issues that Judge Douglas has all the while tried to force this controversy upon without foundation. The real issue in this controversy, I think, springs from a sentiment in the mind, and that sentiment is this: on the one part it looks upon the institution of slavery as being wrong, and on the part of another class, it does not look upon it as wrong. The sentiment that contemplates the institution of slavery as being wrong, is the sentiment of the Republican party, it is the sentiment around which all their actions and all their arguments circle, from which all their propositions radiate. They look upon slavery as a moral, social, and political wrong, and while they contemplate it as being such, they nevertheless have due regard for its actual existence among us, for the difficulties of getting rid of it in the States, and for all the constitutional obligations thrown around it; nevertheless, they do desire to see a policy instituted that looks to the thing not growing any larger; they insist upon a policy that shall treat it as a wrong, and as the mildest policy to that end, they look to the prevention of its growing larger, and to an end of it eventually. All their sentiments, arguments and propositions, are brought within this range. Now I have said, and I repeat it here, if there be any man among us who does not think that the institution of slavery is a wrong — that it is not a wrong in any one of the aspects in which I have spoken, he is misplaced, and ought not to be among us; and, if there by a man who is so impatient of it as a wrong, as to disregard the difficulties of getting rid of it, or as to disregard the constitutional obligations thrown around it, that man too is misplaced; we disclaim sympathy with him in political action; he is not placed properly with us.
By the way, on this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let me say a word. I have asked the question indirectly, what has ever threatened our own liberties and prosperity save and except this very institution of slavery? If this be true, how do you propose to amend it? By spreading it out larger, or making it bigger? You may have a cancer upon your person, and you may not be able to cut it out at once, lest you bleed to death, but you may not treat it as a wrong by spreading it over your whole body. So with this, the way is — it is the peaceful mode to deal with it — to prevent the spread of it into new country. That is the old fashioned way of dealing with it, the example of which our fathers have set us.
On the other hand, I have said that there is a sentiment which treats it as not being a wrong. That is the Democratic sentiment of to-day. I do not mean to say that every man who stands within that range, positively asserts that it is right. That class will include all who do not say that it is right or wrong. This class all fall within the general class of those who do not look upon it as wrong; and now, if there be among you any one that supposes that he is a Democrat can consider and proclaim himself as being as much opposed to it as any body else. I would like to reason with him awhile. You never treat it as a wrong. What other thing that you consider wrong do you treat in that way? You, perhaps, say that it is wrong, but your leader does not say so, and you quarrel with every one else that says it is a wrong, although you say it yourself. We must not say anything about it in the free States, because it is not here; we must not anything about it in the slave States, because it is there; we must not say anything about it in policies, because it will disturb the quietness of my place; and you must not speak of it in the pulpit, because it is not religion. (Applause.) There is no suitable place to oppose it; but finally you say that if they would adopt systems of emancipation in the slave States, you would approve of it — but don’t deceive yourselves; Frank Blair and Gratz Brown and their co-laborers tried that thing in Missouri that you pretend that you would like to see. Blair and Gratz Brown tried that thing and failed, and you threw up your hats and hurrahed for the democracy. (Applause.)
More than that, take all the arguments that are made in favor of the system. Take, first, the system itself that you propose, and it carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in the system of slavery; the arguments that sustain that policy carefully exclude it, and even here, to-day, you hear Judge Douglas quarrelling with me because I utter a wish that it might come some day to an end, although Mr. Clay can stand up and say that he wishes that every slave was in his own country, yet I am denounced as false to Henry Clay for expressing the wish that it may some time, in some way, come to an end. The Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the merest breath expressive of the slightest opposition to it. Try it by some of Senator Douglas’ arguments. He says he don’t care whether it is voted up or down. Now, I don’t care whether that is intended to be expressive of his individual sentiment upon that subject, or whether it is intended to be expressive of the national policy that he desires should be carried out; it is alike valuable for my purposes. I say that a man can logically say that if he sees no wrong in it, but he cannot say so logically if he admits that slavery is wrong. No man can say that he does not care if a wrong is voted up or down, he cannot say that he is indifferent as to a wrong; but he must have a choice between the right or wrong. He says that whatever community desires slavery has a right to it. He can say so logically if it is not a wrong, but if he admits that it is wrong, he cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong. He says upon the score of equality, slaves should be allowed to go into the territories the same as other property. His argument is logical if the properties are alike, but if one is wrong and the other right, then he cannot say that, for there is no equality between the right and the wrong. I say that everything in the Democratic policy, in the shape it takes in legislation, in the Dred Scott decision, in their conversations, every one carefully excludes the thought that there is any thing wrong in it whatever.
That is the real issue! An issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Douglas and myself shall be silent. These are the two principles that are made the eternal struggle between right and wrong, they are the two principles that have stood face to face, one of them asserting the divine right of kings, the same principle that says you work, you toil, you earn bread, and I will eat it. It is the same old serpent, whether it come from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his nation, and to live upon the fat of his neighbor, or, whether it comes from one race of men as an apology for the enslaving of another race of men. It is the same old policy, and I expressed my gratification that the judge at Quincy announced that he looks to no end of this controversy. (Considerable confusion here arising among the crowd — much difficulty was experienced in hearing.) Meanwhile, whenever that issue is clear, whenever we can get clear of those men that look to no end of it, when we can get those men out of that policy, and get them on the side of those who treat it as a wrong, there will soon be an end of it, it will then soon be in the course of ultimate extinction. When that issue can be made, and all extraneous matter can be removed between the combatants, they can settle the matter, and it will be done peacefully, too. There is no war about it. There is no violation of the constitution, no violation of right, or, of the necessities that spring from the actual presence of the thing. We need but that policy again, that places it where the wisest and best men of the world originally placed it.
This man Brooks, of South Carolina, once declared that when this government was first established no one expected the institution of slavery to last until this day. When he said so, he stated a fact which I think is fully established by the history of the times; but, he said that though the men who framed this government were wiser and better men than the men of these days, that the men of these days had experience which their fathers had not, and that experience had brought them the invention of the cotton-gin which had made the perpetuation of the institution of slavery a necessity, I say that, willingly, or unwillingly, with purpose, or without purpose, Judge Douglas has been a most prominent instrument in the changing of the basis on which our fathers originally placed it, and putting it upon Brooks’ cottin-gin basis, placing it where he openly insists that he has no desire for the end of it.
I understand that I have ten minutes yet, and I will employ that time, or a portion of it, with that argument that Judge Douglas uses, while he holds to the Dred Scott decision, that the people of a territory can some way or other decide that question for themselves.
The first thing that I say on that point is, that he frequently said before that decision that it was a question for the courts, but now he virtually tells us that it is not a question for the church. But how does he state it? He says that it needs friendly legislation, and admits of unfriendly legislation, and that although he admits the right of the [slave-holder?] to take a slave into the territory, that with unfriendly legislation the people can really exclude it. I look to the constitutional authority, and I take the gentleman who looks me in the face. We will say he is a member of the territorial legislature; like Judge Douglas, he believes that the right to take and hold slaves there is a constitutional right. The first thing he does is to swear he will support the Constitution; and suppose his neighbor needs legislation that he may be enabled to enjoy that constitutional right, can he withhold that legislation which his neighbor needs for the enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of the United States, which you remember he has sworn to support without violating his oath, I ask? And more especially can he pass unfriendly legislation without violating that oath? Why, this is a monstrous sort of talk about the Constitution of the United States! There never has been such outrageous talk — such lawless talk — about the Constitution of the United States, from any man of respectability, on the assumption, which he believes, that the right to hold slaves is a constitutional right. I don’t believe it is a constitutional right. I believe the decision is improperly made, and go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious in his speech on those who go for reversing it, yet he goes for legislating from it all its force, while he leaves it standing. I affirm here that there never has, from the mouth of a respectable man on earth, been uttered so monstrous a doctrine. (Applause.) Why, I suppose the most of us, I know I myself, believe, the people of the southern States are entitled to a congressional fugitive slave law; that that right is fixed in the Constitution; that it cannot be made available to them without congressional legislation; that it is, in the Judge’s language, a barren right, and that it needs legislation before it can be made efficient, and valuable to the persons to whom it is granted, and we, such as I, agree that that legislation should be maintained for them. On what ground? We profess not to like that legislation, and perhaps have no great taste for running after niggers. I profess to have none — and yet we do. At least, I yield my support to the fugitive slave law. Why? Because I do not understand that the Constitution which gives that right can be carried out if that legislation is withheld, and if I believed that the right to hold slaves in a territory was as firmly fixed as that is, why, on the same principle, I would be bound to give the legislation necessary to support it, and, I say, that no man can deny his obligation to give legislation for slave property in a territory, who believes that it is a constitutional right there. No man can make such an argument that will not give an Abolitionist a stronger argument to deny a fugitive slave law. Try it on and see; if that decision is correct, then that right of the slave power is as great a right as that of the slaveholder shall have his slave returned to him, and the man who argues that by unfriendly legislation, in spite of the constitutional right, slavery may be driven from the territory, furnishes the argument, and cannot avoid the argument upon which the Abolitionist may deny the obligation, and may claim the power to furnish unfriendly legislation against the right of the slaveholder to claim his slave. I don’t know how such a argument may take before a popular audience, but I defy any man to go before a court, or a class of men whose minds are accustomed to hearing arguments of this sort, and deny that there is a bit of difference between them. I defy any man to go before such a class of men — to go and make an argument for adopting unfriendly legislation in the territories, that will not give an argument against the constitutional right to a fugitive slave law.
There is not such an abolitionist in all the States as Douglas.
Mr. Lincoln being run down, stopped, having several minutes to spare.
SENATOR DOUGLAS REPLY.
Senator Douglas’ re-appearance in front of the stand was the signal for a general yell of applause, which fairly shook the earth and startled the old Mississippi which was rolling gently along in all its majesty with a few hundred yards of the stand.
Senator Douglas said
Mr. Lincoln has concluded his remarks by saying that there is no such an Abolitionist as I am in all America. (Laughter.) If he could make the Abolitionists of Illinois believe that, he would not have much show for the Senate. (Great laughter and applause.) Let me make the Abolitionists believe the truth of that statement and his political back is broken. (Renewed laughter.)
His first criticism upon me is the expression of his hope that the war of the administration will be prosecuted against me and the Democratic party of this State with vigor. He wants that war prosecuted with vigor; I have no doubt of it. His hopes of success, and the hopes of his party depend solely upon it. They have no chance of destroying the Democracy of this State except by the aid of federal patronage. (“That’s a fact,” “good,” and cheers.) He has all the federal office-holders here as his allies, (“That’s so,”) running separate tickets against the Democracy to divide the party, although the leaders all intend to vote directly the Abolition ticket, and only leave the green-horns to vote this separate ticket who refuse to do into the Abolition camp. (Laughter and cheers) There is something really refreshing in the thought that Mr. Lincoln is in favor of prosecuting one war vigorously. (Roars of laughter.) It is the first war I ever knew him to be in favor of prosecuting. (Renewed laughter.) It is the first war that I ever knew him to believe to be just or constitutional. (Laughter and cheers.) when the Mexican war being waged, and the American army was surrounded by the enemy in Mexico, he thought that war was unconstitutional, unnecessary and unjust.—(“That’s so” “you’ve got him,” “he voted against it,” &c.) He thought it was not commenced on the right spot. (Laughter.)
When I made an incidental allusion of that kind in the joint discussion over at Charleston some weeks ago, Lincoln, in replying, said that I, Douglas, had charged him with voting against supplies for the Mexican war, and then he reared up, full length, and swore that he never voted against the supplies—that it was a slander—and caught hold of Ficklin, who sat on the stand, and said, “Here, Ficklin, tell the people that it is a lie.” (Laughter and cheers.) Well, Ficklin, who had served in Congress with him, stood up and told them all that he recollected about it. It was that when George Ashmun, of Massachusetts, brought forward a resolution declaring the war unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust, that Lincoln had voted for it. “Yes,” said Lincoln, “I did.” Thus confessed that he voted that the war was wrong, that our country was in the wrong, and consequently that the Mexicans were in the right; but charged that I had slander him by saying that he voted against the supplies. I never charged him with voting against the supplies in my life, because I knew that he was not in Congress when they were voted. (Tremendous shouts of laughter.) The war was commenced on the 13th day of May, 1846, and on that day we appropriated in Congress ten millions of dollars and fifty thousand men to prosecute it. During the same session we voted more men and more money, and at the next session we voted more men and more money, so that by the time Mr. Lincoln entered Congress we had enough men and enough money to carry on the war, and had no occasion to vote any more. (Laughter and cheers.) When he got into the House, being opposed to the war, and not being able to stop the supplies, because they had all gone forward, all he could do was to follow the lead of Corwin, and prove that the war was not begun on the right spot, and that it was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and wrong. Remember, too, that this he did after the war had been begun. It is one thing to be opposed to the declaration of a war, another and very different thing to take sides with the enemy against your own country after the war has been commenced. (“Good.” and cheers.) Our army was in Mexico at the time, many battles had been fought; our citizens, who were defending the honor of their country’s flag, were surrounded by the daggers, the guns and the poison of the enemy. Then it was that Corwin made his speech in which he declared that the American soldiers ought to be welcomed by the Mexicans with bloody hands and hospitable graves; then it was that Ashmun and Lincoln voted in the House of Representatives that the war was unconstitutional and unjust; and Ashmun’s resolution, Corwin’s speech, and Lincoln’s vote were sent to Mexico and read at the head of the Mexican army, to prove to them that there was a Mexican party in the Congress of the United States who were doing all in their power to aid them. (“That’s the truth,” “Lincoln’s a traitor,” etc.) That a man who takes sides with the common enemy against his own country in time of war should rejoice in a war being made on me now, is very natural. (Immense applause.) And in my opinion, no other kind of a man would rejoice in it. (”That’s true,” “hurrah for Douglas.” and cheers.)
Mr. Lincoln has told you a great deal to-day about his being an old line Clay Whig. (“He never was.”) Bear in mind that there are a great many old Clay Whigs down in this region. It is more agreeable, therefore, for him o talk about the old Clay Whig party than it is for him to talk Abolitionism. We did not hear much about the old Clay Whig party up in the Abolition districts. How much of an old line Henry Clay Whig was he? Have you read Gen. Singleton’s speech at Jacksonville? (Yes, yes, and cheers.) You know that Gen. Singleton was, for twenty-five years, the confidential friend of Henry Clay in Illinois, and he testified that in 1847, when the constitutional convention of this State was in session, the Whigs members were invited to a Whig caucus at the house of Mr. Lincoln’s brother-in-law, where Mr. Lincoln proposed to throw Henry Clay overboard and take up Gen. Taylor in his place, giving, as his reason, that if the Whigs did not take up Gen. Taylor the Democrats would. (Cheers and laughter.) Singleton testifies that Lincoln, in that speech, urged, as another reason for throwing Henry Clay overboard, that the Whigs had fought long enough for principle and ought to begin to fight for success. Singleton also testifies that Lincoln’s speech did have the effect of cutting Clay’s throat, and that he, Singleton, and others withdrew from the caucus in indignation. He further states that when they got to Philadelphia to attend the national convention of the Whig party, that Lincoln was there, the bitter and deadly enemy of Clay, and that he tried to keep him (Singleton) out of the convention because he insisted on voting for Clay, and Lincoln was determined to have Taylor. (Laughter and applause.) Singleton says that Lincoln rejoiced with very great joy when he found the mangled remains of the murdered Whig statesman lying cold before him. Now, Mr. Lincoln tells you that he is an old line Clay Whig! (Laughter and cheers.) Gen. Singleton testifies to the facts I have narrated in a public speech which has been printed and circulated broadcast over the States for weeks, yet not a lisp have we heard from Mr. Lincoln on the subject, except that he is an old Clay Whig.
What part of Henry Clay’s policy did Lincoln ever advocate? He was in Congress in 1848-9[1849] when the Wilmot proviso warfare disturbed the peace and harmony of the country until it shook the foundation of the republic from its centre to its circumference. It was that agitation that brought Clay forth from his retirement at Ashland again to occupy his seat in the Senate of the United States, to see if he could not, by his great wisdom and experience, and the renown of his name, do something to restore peace and quiet to a disturbed country. Who got up that sectional strife that Clay had to be called

<Page 2>
upon to quell? I have heard Lincoln boast that he voted forty-two times for the Wilmot proviso, and that he would have voted as many times more if he could. (Laughter.) Lincoln is the man, in connection with Seward, Chase, Giddings, and other Abolitionists, who got up that strife that I helped Clay to put down. (Tremendous applause.) Henry Clay came back to the Senate in 1849, and say that he must do something to restore peace to the country. The Union Whigs and the Union Democrats welcomed him the moment he arrived, as the man for the occasion. We believed that he, of all men on earth, had been preserved by Divine Providence to guide us out of our difficulties, and we Democrats rallied under Clay then, as you Whigs in nullification time rallied under the banner of old Jackson, forgetting party when the country was in danger, in order that we might have a country first, and parties afterwards. (“Three cheers for Douglas.”)
And this reminds me that Mr. Lincoln told you that the slavery question was the only thing that ever disturbed the peace and harmony of the Union. Did not nullification once raise its head and disturb the peace of this Union in 1832? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? Did not disunion raise its monster head during the last war with Great Britain? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? The peace of this country has been disturbed three times, once during the war with Great Britain, once on the tariff question, and once on the slavery question. ("Three cheers for Douglas") His argument, therefore, that slavery is the only question that has ever created dissension in the Union falls to the ground. It is true that agitators are enabled now to use this slavery question for the purpose of sectional strife. (“That’s so.”) He admits that in regard to all things else, the principle that I advocate, making each State and territory free to decide for itself ought to prevail. He instances cranberry laws, and the oyster laws, and he might have gone though the whole list with the same effect. I say that all these laws are local and domestic, and that local and domestic concerns should be left to each State and each territory to manage for itself. If agitators would acquiesce in that principle, there never would be any danger to the peace and harmony of this Union. (“That’s so,” and cheers.)
Mr. Lincoln tries to avoid the main issues by attacking the truth of my proposition, that our fathers made this government divided into free and slave States, recognizing that the right of each to decide all its local questions for itself. Did they not thus make it? It is true that they did not establish slavery in any of the States, or abolish it in any of them; but finding thirteen States twelve of which were slave and one free, they agreed to form a government uniting them together, as they stoo divided into free and slave States, and to guarantee forever to each State the right to do as it pleased on the slavery question. (Cheers.) Having thus made the government, and conferred this right upon each State forever, I assert that this government can exist as they made it, divided into free and slave States, if any one State chooses to retain slavery. (Cheers.) He says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be abolished everywhere. I look forward to a time when each State shall be allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep slavery forever, it is not my business, but its own; if it chooses to abolish slavery, it is its own business—not mine. I care more for the great principle of self-government, the right of the people to rule, that I do for all the negroes in Christendom. (Cheers.) I would not endanger the perpetuity of this Union. I would not blot out the great inalienable rights of the white men for all the negroes that ever existed. (Renewed applause.) Hence, I say, let us maintain this government on the principles that our fathers made it, recognizing the right of each State to keep slavery as long as it people determine, or to abolish it when they please. (Cheers.) But Mr. Lincoln says that when our fathers made this government they did not look forward to the state of things now existing; and therefore he thinks the doctrine was wrong; and he quotes Brooks, of South Carolina, to prove that our fathers then thought that probably slavery would be abolished, by each State acting for itself before this time. Suppose they did; suppose they did not foresee what has occurred,—does that change the principles of our government? They did not probably foresee the telegraph that transmits intelligence by lightning, nor did they foresee the railroads that now form the bonds of union between the different States, or the thousand mechanical inventions that have elevated mankind. But do these things change the principles of the government? Our fathers, I say, made this government on the principle of the right of each State to do as it pleases in its own domestic affairs, subject to the constitution, and allowed the people of each to apply to every new change of circumstance such remedy as they may see fit to improve their condition. This right they have for all time to come. (Cheers.)
Mr. Lincoln went on to tell you that he does not at all de ire to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists, nor does his party. I expected him to say that down here. (Laughter.) Let me ask him then how he is going to put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction everywhere, if he does not intend to interfere with it in the States where it exists? (Renewed laughter.) He says that he will prohibit it in all territories, and the inference is then that unless they make free States out of them he will keep them out of the Union; for, mark you, he did not say whether or not he would vote to admit Kansas with slavery or not, as her people might apply; (he forgot that as usual, &c;) he did not say whether or not he was in favor of bringing the territories now in existence into the Union on the principle of Clay’s compromise measures on the slavery question. I told you that he would not. (Give it to him, he deserves it, &c.) His idea is that he will prohibit slavery in all the territories, and thus force them all to become free States, surrounding the slave States with a cordon of free States, and hemming them in, keeping the slaves confined to their present limits whilst they go on multiplying until the soil on which they live will no longer feed them, and he will thus be able to put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction by starvation. (Cheers.) He will extinguish slavery in the Southern States as the French general exterminated the Algerines when he smoked them out. He is going to extinguish slavery by surrounding the slave States, hemming in the slaves, and starving them out of existence as you smoke a fix out of his hole. And he intends to do that in the name of humanity and Christianity, in order that we may get rid of the terrible crime and sin entailed upon our fathers of holding slaves. (Laughter and cheers). Mr. Lincoln makes out that line of policy, and appeals to the moral sense of justice, and to the Christian feeling of the community to sustain him. He says that any man who holds to the contrary doctrine is in the position of the king who claimed to govern by divine right. Let us examine for a moment and see what principle it was that overthrew the divine right of George the Third to govern us. Did not these colonies rebel because the British parliament had no right to pass laws concerning our property and domestic and private institutions without our consent? We demanded that the British government should not pass such laws unless they gave us representation in the body passing them,—and this the British government insisting on doing,—we went to war, on the principle that the home government should not control and govern distant colonies without giving them a representation. Now, Mr. Lincoln proposes to govern the territories without giving the people a representation, and calls on Congress to pass laws controlling their property and domestic concerns without their consent and against their will. Thus, he asserts for his party the identical principle asserted by George III and the tories of the Revolution. (Cheers.)
I ask you to look into these things, and then to tell me whether the democracy or the abolitionists are right. I hold that the people of a territory, like those of a States, (I use the language of Mr. Buchanan in his letter of acceptance,) have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. (“That’s the idea,” “Hurrah for Douglas.”) They point upon which Chief Justice Taney expresses his opinion is simply this, that slaves being property, stand on an equal footing with other property, and consequently that the owner has the same right to carry that property into a territory that he has any other, subject to the same conditions. Suppose that one of your merchants was to take fifty or one hundred thousand dollars worth of liquors to Kansas. He has a right to go there under that decision, but when he gets there he finds the Maine liquor law in force, and what can he do with his property after he gets it there? He cannot sell it, he cannot use it, it is subject to the local law, and that law is against him, and the best thing he can do with it is to bring it back into Missouri or Illinois and sell it. If you take negroes to Kansas, as Col. Jeff.[Jefferson] Davis said in his Bangor speech, from which I have quoted to-day, you must take them there subject to local law. If the people want the institution of slavery they will protect and encourage it; but if they do not want it they will withhold that protection, and the absence of local legislation protecting slavery excludes it as completely as a positive prohibition. (“That’s so, and cheers.) You slaveholders of Missouri might as well understand what you know practically, that you cannot carry slavery where the people do not want it. (“That’s so.”) All you have a right to ask is that the people shall do as they please; if they want slavery let them have it; if they do not want it, allow them to refuse to encourage it.
My friends, if, as I have said before, we will only live up to this great fundamental principle there will be peace between the North and the South. Mr. Lincoln admits t at under the constitution on all domestic questions, except slavery, we ought not to interfere with the people of each State. What right have we to interfere with slavery any more than we have to interfere with any other question. He says that this slavery question is now the bone of contention. Why? Simply because agitators have combined in all the free States to make war upon it. Suppose the agitators in the States should combine in one-half of the Union to make war upon the railroad system of the other half? They would thus be driven to the same sectional strife. Suppose one section makes war upon any other peculiar institution of the opposite section, and the same strife is produced. They only remedy and safety is that we shall stand by the constitution as our fathers made it, obey the laws, as they are passed, while they stand the proper test and sustain the decisions of the Supreme Court and the constituted authorities.
Senator Douglas’ half hour here expired. For some minutes after he concluded, the applause was perfectly deafening and overwhelming. He seemed to have carried his vast auditory entirely with him, in sympathy and feeling, for their enthusiasm was boundless.
1Buchanan Democrats

Copy of Printed Document, 2 page(s), Daily Chicago Times , (Chicago, IL) , 17 October 1858, 2:1-8; 3:1